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CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND CLIMATE JUSTICE:
A PROPOSAL FOR A POLLUTER-FINANCED
RELOCATION FUND FOR FEDERALLY RECOGNIZED
TRIBES IMPERILED BY CLIMATE CHANGE
Randall S. Abate∗
INTRODUCTION
Climate change threatens to displace as many as 200 million
people internally and across national borders by the middle of the
twenty-first century.1 Unpredictable climate, increased frequency of
natural disasters, and rising sea levels are forcing people throughout
the world in vulnerable regions to leave their homes in search of safer
ground.2
Indigenous peoples are among the most vulnerable to these
changes. Climate change poses not only a threat to their property, but
also a threat to their way of life.3 Indigenous peoples are tied to their
lands religiously and culturally, and for basic necessities.4 A loss of
their land could result in a loss of their identity and eventual loss of
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1. Holly D. Lange, Climate Refugees Require Relocation Assistance:
Guaranteeing Adequate Land Assets Through Treaties Based on the National
Adaptation Programmes of Action, 19 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 613, 613 (2010).
2. See Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous People and Environmental Justice: The
Impact of Climate Change, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1625, 1635–1646 (2007).
3. Id. at 1640, 1645–46.
4. Id. at 1645–46.
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their lives.5 Indigenous peoples are also vulnerable because many
indigenous communities do not have the funds to protect themselves
from the harsh effects of climate change.6 Moreover, in the event that
their land becomes uninhabitable due to the effects of climate
change, they lack the resources to relocate their community.7
This struggle is underway in the Native Village of Kivalina. This
village of approximately 400 residents is located approximately
seventy miles north of the Arctic Circle on a thin strip of land
precariously positioned between the Chukchi Sea and a lagoon in
Northwest Alaska.8 In 2006, the United States Army Corps of
Engineers (USACE) projected that Kivalina would be completely lost
due to erosion in ten to fifteen years.9 With the loss of their village
rapidly approaching, the residents of Kivalina are captives in their
homeland bracing for disaster because they do not have the millions
of dollars10 needed to relocate and there is no government fund or
process in place to provide them with adequate assistance.11
5. Id.
6. E. Rania Rampersad, Indigenous Adaptation to Climate Change: Preserving
Sustainable Relationships through an Environmental Stewardship Claim & Trust
Fund Remedy, 21 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 591, 594 (2009). See also GLENN
GRAY & ASSOCIATES FOR THE CITY OF KIVALINA, SITUATION ASSESSMENT:
KIVALINA CONSENSUS BUILDING PROJECT 6 (July 2010), http://www.relocateak.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Situation_Assessment_Final_July_
20105.pdf [hereinafter SITUATION ASSESSMENT].
7. For a comprehensive discussion of the impacts of climate change on
indigenous peoples and the potential legal remedies available to address the
challenges that they face, see generally CLIMATE CHANGE AND INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES: THE SEARCH FOR LEGAL REMEDIES (Randall S. Abate & Elizabeth Ann
Kronk eds., 2013).
8. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 853 (9th
Cir. 2012).
9. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, ALASKA DIST., ALASKA VILLAGE
EROSION TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM 21–25 (2006), http://www4.nau.edu/
tribalclimatechange/resources/docs/res_USArmyCorpEngAKVillErosionTechAssis
tProg.pdf [hereinafter ASSISTANCE PROGRAM].
10. The estimated cost of relocating the village has ranged between 100 and 400
million dollars. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-142, ALASKA
NATIVE VILLAGES: MOST ARE AFFECTED BY FLOODING AND EROSION, BUT FEW
QUALIFY FOR FEDERAL ASSISTANCE 32 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 GAO REPORT].
11. Christine Shearer, Relocating Alaskan Natives: The Climate Is Changing
Faster than Disaster Management and Adaptation Policies, THINKPROGRESS (July
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There are five potential sources of relief for Kivalina and similarly
situated vulnerable indigenous communities: (1) an international
community response, likely connected to a post-Kyoto climate
change agreement; (2) a U.S. government response; (3) a state
government response; (4) climate change litigation in U.S. courts;
and (5) a private sector-funded relocation fund.
Although a climate change fund exists at the international level,
known as the “Green Climate Fund,”12 resources in this fund are
provided by developed nations and are applied exclusively to
enhancing climate change mitigation and adaptation projects in
developing nations.13 The United States is not a developing nation
eligible for such funds. Therefore, the Native Village of Kivalina
must rely on the U.S. government or the Alaska state government for
relocation assistance because it is not eligible for assistance from the
international community.
The U.S. government can and should take a more proactive role in
addressing climate change adaptation and the potentially devastating
consequences that climate change impacts will have on vulnerable
populations in high-risk areas. The highest priority vulnerable
population for the government should be federally recognized tribes,
like the Native Village of Kivalina. The federal government has a
treaty-based trust relationship that requires the federal government to
vigorously protect these tribes’ interests and protect them from
harm.14 Unfortunately, as of this writing, Kivalina’s efforts to seek
assistance from the federal government and the government of
Alaska have failed to provide the funding necessary for relocation.15
21, 2011, 3:51 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2011/07/21/275552/alaskaclimate-adaptation.
12. See generally GREEN CLIMATE FUND, http://gcfund.net/home.html (last
visited Nov. 12, 2013).
13. See Rep. of the Conf. of the Parties, 17th Sess., Mar. 15, 2012, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, 63, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a
01.pdf.
14. See generally NELL JESSUP NEWTON ET AL., COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (2006) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK].
15. But see Press Release, Office of Governor Sean Parnell, Funding Proposed
for Kivalina Evacuation Road (Mar. 20, 2013), http://gov.alaska.gov/parnell/pressroom/full-press-release.html?pr=6398 ($2.5 million capital budget amendment
submitted by Alaska governor to legislature that seeks to authorize development of
an eight-mile evacuation and access road for the Native Village of Kivalina).
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As a last resort, the Native Village of Kivalina attempted to secure
funds necessary for relocation by asserting a federal common law
public nuisance claim in a lawsuit against several large corporations
responsible for emitting significant quantities of greenhouse gases.16
In 2009, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California held that Kivalina lacked standing to bring its claim and
that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim because it was a
non-justiciable political question.17 Three years later, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the dismissal of
Kivalina’s claim, holding that public nuisance claims based on
federal common law are displaced by the Clean Air Act,18 leaving the
residents of the Native Village of Kivalina with no recovery and little
hope for an alternate legal theory to support their claim.19
In the wake of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, Kivalina residents and
other similarly situated federally recognized tribes facing the threat
of displacement from climate change impacts are at a loss for
assistance. A new climate change adaptation remedy is urgently
needed in the United States to establish a relocation fund that would
provide proactive relocation funding to these communities that are
most vulnerable and in need of assistance. The resources for such a
fund could be derived at least in part from a carbon tax on private
sector entities, comparable to the funding mechanism that generated
16. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp.2d 863, 868
(N.D. Cal. 2009).
17. Id.
18. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2006).
19. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 868–69 (9th
Cir. 2012). Other creative and desperate efforts to use the court system as a
possible vehicle for relief for climate change impacts in Alaska continue as of this
writing. In 2012, an Alaska teenager sued the state for loss of permafrost in his
backyard. The suit is premised on the atmospheric trust doctrine and alleges that
the state is not fulfilling its public trust duty to protect atmospheric resources in the
state by failing to adequately regulate greenhouse gas emissions in the state. The
superior court dismissed the case and the plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court
of Alaska. See Press Release, Our Children’s Trust et al., Alaska Youth Pursue
Climate Case (Nov. 16, 2012), http://ourchildrenstrust.org/sites/default/files/12-1116%20AK%20Press%20Release%20.pdf; Salvatore Cardoni, Teen Sues Alaska
Because Climate Change Is Melting His Backyard, TAKE PART (Mar. 18, 2013),
http://www.takepart.com/article/2013/03/18/teenager-sues-alaska-because-climatechange-melting-away-his-hometown.
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the “Superfund” under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).20
Part I of this article describes the factual context of the Kivalina
litigation and how the disappointing outcome in the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in this case sets the stage for the need for a climate change
relocation fund. Part II examines existing sources of federal authority
for relocation under U.S. law and how they could serve as a
conceptual foundation for a climate change relocation fund. Part III
considers comparative law perspectives on proactive relocation
responses to impending natural disasters and the use of private sector
financed climate change adaptation funds. Part IV proposes possible
models for a climate change relocation fund in the United States and
recommends that the availability of the fund be limited to federally
recognized tribes.21
I.

THE KIVALINA LITIGATION: CASE STUDY IN THE NEED FOR A
RELOCATION FUND

The Native Village of Kivalina is a self-governing, federally
recognized tribe of Inupiat Native Alaskans. The Kivalina coast is
composed of sea ice, which acts as a barrier for the small village
against coastal storms and waves.22 In the past decade, storms have
caused the loss of approximately 100 feet from the Kivalina
coastline.23 Homes and buildings are in imminent danger of falling

20. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006).
21. There are two categories of indigenous nations in the United States. The
first group is those that have been federally recognized by Congress. Congress has
the ability to recognize certain indigenous nations under the U.S. Constitution’s
Indian Commerce Clause. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. By virtue of being federally
recognized, these indigenous nations possess certain rights and responsibilities that
non-federally recognized nations do not possess. See generally COHEN’S
HANDBOOK, supra note 14. The list of federally recognized tribes is available at 77
Fed. Reg. 47,868 (Aug. 10, 2012). The second group is those that have not been
federally recognized and, therefore, do not have access to the same privileges and
legal principles applicable to federally recognized tribes.
22. CHRISTINE SHEARER, KIVALINA: A CLIMATE CHANGE STORY 15 (2011).
23. Id. at 14–15.
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into the sea and critical infrastructure is threatened with permanent
destruction.24
The progressive reduction of the protective sea ice in Kivalina has
rendered the island uninhabitable and has prompted a thorough
investigation of prospects for relocation in the immediate future. In
2003, the USACE and the United States Government Accountability
Office predicted that a dangerous combination of storm activity
“could flood the entire village at any time.”25 A decade later, the
inhabitants of Kivalina continue to live in fear of being destroyed by
the effects of climate change and remain unable to afford the millions
of dollars in relocation costs necessary to reestablish the community
in a safer location.
With no available options under federal or state law to ensure the
safety of their future, the Native Village of Kivalina and the City of
Kivalina (plaintiffs) filed a federal common law public nuisance
claim against twenty-two major oil, energy, and utility companies to
seek damages for the costs of relocating their community of
approximately 400 residents.26 The plaintiffs alleged that these
defendants were “substantial contributors to global warming,”27 and
that the greenhouse gas emissions from these companies exacerbated
sea level rise and ultimately contributed to increased coastal erosion
that destroyed part of their village and will require relocation of
Kivalina’s residents.28 The plaintiffs also claimed that these

24. Appellant’s Opening Brief at 8, Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil
Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2010), No. 09-17490.
25. 2003 GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 32.
26. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 853 (9th
Cir. 2012). The defendants are: (1) ExxonMobil Corporation; (2) BP P.L.C.; (3) BP
America, Inc.; (4) BP Products North America, Inc.; (5) Chevron Corporation; (6)
Chevron U.S.A., Inc.; (7) ConocoPhillips Company; (8) Royal Dutch Shell PLC;
(9) Shell Oil Company; (10) Peabody Energy Corporation; (11) The AES
Corporation; (12) American Electric Power Company, Inc.; (13) American Electric
Power Services Corporation; (14) Duke Energy Corporation; (15) DTE Energy
Company; (16) Edison International; (17) Midamerican Energy Holdings
Company; (18) Pinnacle West Capital Corporation; (19) The Southern Company;
(20) Dynegy Holdings, Inc.; (21) Xcel Energy, Inc.; and (22) Genon Energy, Inc.
27. Id. at 854.
28. Id. at 853–54.
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companies were “conspiring to mislead the public about the science
of global warming.”29
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California dismissed the case because the plaintiffs lacked standing30
and because the dispute was non-justiciable under the political
question doctrine.31 In a 3-0 decision, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit relied on federal displacement
reasoning to affirm the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’
claims.32 The court concluded that regardless of whether Kivalina
could assert a valid public nuisance claim against the defendants,
“[i]f Congress has addressed a federal issue by statute, then there is
no gap for federal common law to fill.”33 Relying on the 2011 U.S.
Supreme Court decision in American Electric Power Co. v.
Connecticut,34 the court held that if a statute (in this instance, the
Clean Air Act) directly addresses the issue in dispute, federal
common law claims are barred.35
Options in the U.S. court system for the Kivalina plaintiffs are now
extremely limited and unlikely to succeed. They can appeal to the
U.S. Supreme Court, which is unlikely to hear the case in the absence
of a split in the circuits.36 They can also file a new case in state court
29. Id. at 854. A discussion of the civil conspiracy claim is beyond the scope of
this article.
30. Id.
31. Id. The political question doctrine refers to matters that federal courts will
not adjudicate because they are inappropriate for judicial review. ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 103 (3d ed. 2009). The doctrine is supported
by separation of powers principles in that it “minimizes judicial intrusion into the
operations of the other branches of government and that it allocates decisions to the
branches of government that have superior expertise in particular areas.” Id.
32. Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 853.
33. Id. at 856.
34. American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
35. Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 857. The plaintiffs subsequently filed a petition for
rehearing en banc with the Ninth Circuit. On November 27, 2012, the Ninth Circuit
denied the petition in a two-sentence decision: “The panel has voted to deny the
petition for rehearing en banc. The full court has been advised of the petition for
rehearing en banc, and no judge of the court has requested a vote on the petition for
rehearing en banc.” Order on Petition for Rehearing at 1, Native Village of
Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2010), No. 09-17490.
36. J. Wylie Donald, No En Banc Appeal in Kivalina; So What’s Next for
Climate Change Litigation?, CLIMATE LAWYERS (Dec. 8, 2012, 10:18 PM),
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alleging a state law-based public nuisance claim. This approach is
also unlikely to succeed because the courts will likely conclude that
the Clean Air Act preempts such claims.37
In light of these grim realities, the Native Village of Kivalina is in
a desperate situation. Federal and state laws in the United States do
not currently authorize an outlay of funds to assist a community like
Kivalina to relocate proactively before climate change-related
disaster strikes. Current federal laws authorize relocation for
communities in the United States only after they have been imperiled
by a crisis.38 This approach is unworkable in the climate change
context. “Imminent peril” needs to be the trigger for relocation
because responding to a crisis caused by climate change impacts after
it has occurred would involve a significant and unnecessary loss of
lives.39 Therefore, a climate change relocation fund is necessary to
fill this remedial gap.
II. FEDERAL AUTHORITY FOR RELOCATION UNDER U.S. LAW
The international community now widely recognizes that largescale population displacement due to climate change is impending
and requires international cooperation. Unfortunately, the United
States has played a marginal role at best in international climate
change negotiations and is reluctant to subject itself to any binding
commitments related to climate change adaptation. Therefore,
proactive intervention to establish funding for permanent relocation
for vulnerable federally recognized tribes in the United States is

http://www.climatelawyers.com/post/2012/12/08/No-En-Banc-Appeal-inKivalina3b-So-Whats-Next.aspx. On May 20, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court
denied Kivalina’s petition for writ of certiorari. See Jessica M. Karmasek, U.S. SC
Denies Alaskan Village’s Petition for Review of Global Warming Case, LEGAL
NEWSLINE (May 20, 2013, 11:00 AM), http://legalnewsline.com/issues/globalwarming/241681-u-s-sc-denies-alaskan-villages-petition-for-review-of-globalwarming-case.
37. Id.
38. See infra Part II for a discussion of two such federal laws.
39. The standard for demonstrating the injury-in-fact element of standing
provides support for this imminent peril theory. Federal courts have concluded that
plaintiffs’ asserted injury to establish standing can be either actual or imminent.
See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
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essential to safeguard the culture and livelihood of these
communities.
This section of the paper explores existing federal mechanisms for
relocation as possible foundations for this new fund. Federal law
addressing permanent relocation as a remedy for climate change
displacement does not exist in the United States. A permanent
relocation remedy is available in limited circumstances under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act (CERCLA),40 where exposure to hazardous waste
contamination necessitates the relocation of residents premised on a
cost-benefit analysis. Unlike the protections available under
CERCLA, there is no mandate that protects the residents of Kivalina
and similarly situated federally recognized tribes requiring
responsible parties to pay to guard against the citizens’ loss of
homeland.
A climate change fund to assist in the relocation of federally
recognized tribes that require relocation due to climate change
impacts could be established in a variety of formats.41 Two
significant federal frameworks that address relocation, CERCLA and
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), are discussed
in this section to illustrate how narrow and rare the remedy of
permanent relocation is under federal law.
A. CERCLA
In response to the Love Canal disaster and to protect the public
from the dangers of hazardous waste contamination, Congress
enacted CERCLA in 1980.42 CERCLA was enacted to implement a
systematic process for identifying and responding to contaminated
sites backed by the largest environmental fund in the history of the
United States, the revenues for which were generated by taxpayers
40. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006).
41. There are several funds in place at the federal and state levels that provide a
useful framework for determining the characteristics of a climate relocation fund.
See infra Part IV.
42. Daryl Dworkin, Love Canal and the Superfund—30 Years Later, EXAMINER
(Apr. 22, 2011), http://www.examiner.com/article/love-canal-and-the-superfund30-years-later.
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and the polluters themselves.43 An integral component of this
statutory scheme was the Hazardous Substance Superfund
[hereinafter Superfund] that Congress created as part of CERCLA to
compensate state and federal governments if the responsible parties
cannot be identified or are unable to undertake such activities
themselves in hazardous waste site cleanups.44 Taxes generated from
the chemical and petroleum industries that benefit from producing
contaminating products supplied the Superfund with approximately
$1.5 billion annually.45
When Congress enacted CERCLA, it intended to make the
polluters pay for the cost of cleaning up these sites and instituted the
tax to achieve this end. Moreover, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) seeks to hold those parties who contributed to the
contamination responsible for the cost of CERCLA cleanups.46 Such
parties may be asked to help pay for the cleanup of a site even if they
acted in full accordance with the law “at the time they disposed of the
waste.”47
CERCLA was established to ensure that cleanups would continue
despite the tactics that prolong litigation. When Congress enacted
CERCLA, it embraced a concept popularized by Western European
nations where manufacturers and importers of products bear a
significant degree of responsibility for the environmental impacts
their products cause throughout the product life cycle.48 The
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
includes “upstream impacts inherent in the selection of materials for
the products, impacts from manufacturers’ production process itself,
43. Id.
44. 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (2006).
45. This amount was raised to $8.5 billion under the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986)
(codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
46. Potentially responsible parties under CERCLA are: (1) past owners or
operators; (2) current owners or operators; (3) arrangers; and (4) transporters. 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2006).
47. OFFICE OF SITE REMEDIATION ENFORCEMENT, EPA, SUPERFUND AND
SMALL WASTE CONTRIBUTORS (2008), http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/
publications/cleanup/superfund/sm-waste-contrib-rev.pdf.
48. See Fact Sheet: Extended Producer Responsibility, ORG. ECON. COOPERATION
&
DEV.,
(2006),
http://www.oecd.org/env/
resourceproductivityandwaste/factsheetextendedproducerresponsibility.htm.
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and downstream impacts from the use and disposal of the
products.”49 Similar to CERCLA liability in the United States,
European producers accept their responsibility when designing their
products to “minimize life-cycle environmental impacts, and when
accepting legal, physical or socio-economic responsibility for
environmental impacts that cannot be eliminated by design,”50
highlighting the “abnormally dangerous activity”51 context
fundamental to CERCLA.
In 1995, Congress allowed the Superfund tax to expire, and the
trust balance fell from $3.8 billion in 1996 to zero in 2003.52 “Instead
of polluters paying, the U.S. Treasury has since subsidized cleanups,
and financial allocation to Superfund has dramatically fallen.”53 A
sharp decline in Superfund cleanups has resulted from reduced
funding and fewer initiated cleanups, as well as a slower rate of
completion. For example, the EPA completed eighty-nine cleanups in
1999, but a mere nineteen in 2009.54
CERCLA authorizes the EPA to permanently relocate residences
and businesses as a remedy when it would be more cost effective
than the process and expense of securing health and safety if such
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. “Abnormally dangerous activity” is a term of art, and has been defined in
the following manner:
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the
following factors are to be considered: (a) existence of a high degree of
risk of some harm to the person, land, or chattels of others; (b)
likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; (c) inability to
eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; (d) extent to which
the activity is not a matter of common usage; (e) inappropriateness of
the activity to the place where it is carried on; and (f) extent to which its
value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
52. Braunson Virjee, Stimulating the Future of Superfund: Why the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act Calls for a Reinstatement of the Superfund Tax to
Polluted Sites in Urban Environments, 11 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 27, 27
(2010).
53. Id.
54. Juliet Eilperin, Obama, EPA to Push for Restoration of Superfund Tax on
Oil, Chemical Companies, WASH. POST (June 21, 2010), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/20/
AR2010062001789.html.
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residences and businesses were to remain located near the hazardous
waste disposal site.55 EPA’s decision to authorize permanent
relocation as a remedy under CERCLA was established in response
to concerns regarding the need to limit relocation as a remedy to only
temporary relocations while cleanup efforts were undertaken near
Superfund sites. However, after years of considering the cost of
permanent relocation as compared to the cost of remediating the
environment so that it is fit for residential life, EPA’s “National
Superfund Permanent Relocation Interim Policy”56 was established in
July 1999.
The interim relocation policy applies only to remedial actions at
National Priorities List (NPL) sites; it does not apply to removal
actions.57 All CERCLA cleanups, regardless of who undertakes them,
are governed by the National Oil and Hazardous Substances
Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP),58 which identifies the steps for
identifying and investigating sites presumed to contain hazardous
material. The NCP also evaluates possible strategies for remediation
and determines the actual cleanup encompassing both removal and
remediation efforts. In order for a state or the EPA to recover for
response actions, their actions must be “not inconsistent” with the
NCP, whereas all other parties must show that their actions were
“consistent” with the NCP.59
55. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
§ 101(24), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (2006); 40 C.F.R. § 300.430 (2012);
Memorandum on Interim Policy on the Use of Permanent Relocations as Part of
Superfund Remedial Actions from Timothy Fields, Jr., Acting Assistant Adm’r,
EPA Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, to Superfund National
Policy Managers, Regions I–X & Regional Counsels, Regions I–X, (June 30,
1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/superfund/community/relocation/intpol.pdf
[hereinafter Memorandum on Interim Policy].
56. National Superfund Permanent Relocation Interim Policy, 64 Fed. Reg.
37012.
57. Id. at 37012. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(23)–(24). (The term “removal”
includes and makes recoverable the costs of temporary evacuation and relocation
whereas the term “remedial action” includes and makes recoverable the costs of
permanent relocations of residents, businesses and community facilities if the
President has determined that relocation is cost-effective and environmentally
preferable to other options.).
58. 40 C.F.R. § 300 (2013).
59. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
§§ 107(a)(4)(A)–(B), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4)(A)–(B) (2006).
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A landmark case in relocation as a remedy for hazardous waste
contamination under CERCLA occurred in Escambia County,
Florida. The Escambia Wood Treating Company, a 26-acre facility,
is an abandoned wood preserving facility that operated from 1942
until closing in 1982. The company discharged spent creosote and
PCB-laden waste into unlined holding ponds at the location during
operation before the facility closed in 1982. In October 1991, the
EPA began a removal action to excavate contaminated materials. The
excavated material is currently stockpiled under a secure cover onsite.60
In April 1996, the EPA permanently relocated sixty-six families as
part of a remedial action involving the excavation and removal of
dioxin-contaminated soil in Pensacola, Florida. Residents near the
Escambia Wood Treating Superfund site believed that more than 300
families should have been relocated. After a great deal of
controversy, the EPA decided in February 1997 to permanently
relocate 358 families and to clean up the contaminated property to
levels that would be protective for industrial use.61
Courts have held that a plaintiff is not required to obtain prior
presidential approval under CERCLA to recover costs of temporary
relocation.62 The Tenth Circuit in Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co.63
addressed whether presidential approval is a prerequisite to recovery
of costs for all types of permanent relocations.64 Given the concern
for efficient use of resources expressed in the statute and the
overwhelmingly expensive prospect of permanently relocating
residents, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the requirement of
presidential approval should apply not only to permanent relocations
to protect residents from exposure, but also to permanent relocations
60. Escambia Wood—Pensacola, EPA REGION 4: SUPERFUND, http://www.epa.
gov/region4/superfund/sites/npl/florida/escwprefl.html (last updated July 23, 2013).
For a discussion of the Escambia scenario, see generally Steve Lerner, Pensacola,
Florida: Living Next Door to Mount Dioxin and a Chemical Fertilizer Superfund
Site, COLLABORATIVE ON HEALTH & THE ENV’T (Nov. 30, 2007), http://www.
healthandenvironment.org/articles/homepage/2628.
61. See Memorandum on Interim Policy, supra note 55, at 2.
62. See, e.g., Lutz v. Chromatex, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 413, 419–20 (M.D. Pa.
1989).
63. Colorado v. Idarado Min. Co., 916 F.2d 1486 (10th Cir. 1990).
64. Id. at 1498–99.
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necessary to construct remedial facilities.65 To date, claims seeking
additional living expenses in relocation cases such as post-relocation
increased rent, utility expenses, and commuting charges have not
been successful.66 Therefore, permanent relocation under CERCLA
is a rare and limited remedy.67
B. FEMA
Government agencies play a critical role in hazard mitigation and
disaster relief, from rebuilding destroyed infrastructure to aiding
residents displaced from their homes. The process is cumbersome
and the relationships between various government actors, from the
local to the national levels, can be complex to a degree that residents
in need of assistance remain helpless. The primary focus of the U.S.
government today is a short-term, reactive approach: wait for disaster
and then try to clean it up. This approach is woefully inadequate,
however, to protect those citizens who can never return to their
homes after disaster strikes, such as the residents of Native Village of
Kivalina after coastal erosion makes their current location
uninhabitable.
The United States has an existing framework that addresses longterm mitigation and adaptation strategies necessary to confront
65. Id. at 1499.
66. See, e.g., Wehner v. Syntex Corp., 681 F. Supp. 651 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
67. A recent consent decree entered under the Clean Water Act offers some
hope, however, for the proactive relocation approach that would be necessary to
implement the climate change relocation fund proposed in this article. On March
19, 2013, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana
entered a consent decree to resolve a citizen suit brought by the Louisiana
Environmental Action Network. Order, La. Envtl. Action Network v. City of Baton
Rouge, No. 10-cv-187 (M.D. La. Mar. 19, 2013), available at http://www.tulane.
edu/~telc/assets/pdfs/3-19-13_ConsntDecree-BR_Sewer.pdf. By the terms of the
consent decree, the City of Baton Rouge agreed to (1) create a buffer zone around
its North Wastewater Treatment Plant by relocating more than forty households
from a predominantly minority, low-income community, (2) pay fair market value
for affected homes without regard to the proximity of the sewage treatment plant,
and (3) comply with the federal Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property
Acquisition Policies Act, including provisions for paying for moving expenses,
providing replacement housing expenses when necessary to get residents into
“decent, safe, and sanitary” homes, and ensuring that no person be displaced before
Baton Rouge makes “comparable replacement dwellings” available. Id.
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gradually displaced communities. In 2003, the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) determined that flooding and erosion
affect 184 indigenous villages and specifically that four of them
faced imminent threats of disaster—Kivalina, Koyukuk, Newtok, and
Shishmaref.68 In 2009, the GAO issued a second report finding that
number had tripled and now twelve communities face imminent
destruction, and yet no discussion had begun on a strategy to mitigate
the ensuing consequences of flooding and coastal erosion.69 The
report highlighted general governance issues and explained that no
government agency at this time has the necessary authority to
relocate communities.70 This regulatory gap is primarily due to the
fact that no governmental organization exists that can address the
strategic planning needs of relocation, and no funding is specifically
designated for relocation.71
Only temporary relocation assistance is currently available from
FEMA to victims of a limited number of enumerated natural
disasters. Federal programs to assist threatened villages to prepare for
such disasters and to protect and relocate them are limited and
unavailable without certain qualifying elements that the Alaskan
villages do not meet.72 Although other federal agencies, such as
Housing and Urban Development, have limited temporary relocation

68. See 2003 GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 2, 4.
69. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-551, LIMITED PROGRESS
HAS BEEN MADE ON RELOCATING VILLAGES THREATENED BY FLOODING AND
EROSION (2009).
70. Id. at 27–28.
71. Id. at 20–22.
72. Mitigation planning under FEMA is only available to Indian tribal
governments. FEMA regulations define “Indian tribal government” as:
[A]ny Federally recognized governing body of an Indian or Alaska
Native tribe, band, nation, pueblo, village, or community that the
Secretary of Interior acknowledges to exist as an Indian tribe under the
Federally Recognized Tribe List Act of 1994, 25 U.S.C. 479a. This does
not include Alaska Native corporations, the ownership of which is
vested in private individuals.” Therefore, many Native Alaskan
communities imperiled by climate change impacts are ineligible even for
this temporary relocation assistance.
See 44 C.F.R. § 201 (2013).
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funding available, there is no comprehensive proactive federal
program to assist communities with permanent relocation.73
FEMA is an agency of the United States Department of Homeland
Security, initially created by the Presidential Reorganization Plan of
197874 and implemented by Executive Order.75 The goal of FEMA
was to streamline the process of responding to a disaster so an
effective, coordinated effort could be undertaken. FEMA is not
equipped to address long-term gradual displacement, however.
Apart from providing a national defense, responding to national
catastrophes is arguably the preeminent role of a central government.
Before FEMA became an independent agency, the U.S.
government’s response to disasters was a disjointed process executed
by multiple agencies pursuant to various statutes. Prior to FEMA,
each individual aspect of recovery had to be implemented by the
appropriate agency, which involved more than 100 agencies.76 For
example, in the event of a crisis, the Bureau of Public Roads77
financed the reconstruction of highways and roads; the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, acting under authority of the Flood Control Act
of 1944,78 controlled the flooding and irrigation aspects of recovery;
and the Housing and Home Finance Agency handled loss of homes
and displacement of families. A single comprehensive strategy was
necessary to meet the nation’s disaster response needs. FEMA is the
federal government’s attempt to consolidate these several functions.
FEMA’s primary purpose is to coordinate the response to a disaster
that has occurred in the United States and that overwhelms the
resources of local and state authorities.79 In addition to response,
FEMA provides incentives to states to construct infrastructure that
73. 2003 GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 24.
74. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 41943 (Sept. 19, 1978)
(establishing the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and providing for the
transfer of functions and the transfer and abolition of agencies and offices).
75. Exec. Order No. 12127, 44 Fed. Reg. 19367 (Mar. 31, 1979).
76. About the Agency, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, http://www.fema.
gov/about-agency (last visited Nov. 14, 2013).
77. The Bureau of Public Roads was under the direction of the Department of
Transportation and the predecessor to the Federal Highway Administration. See
generally NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION LIBRARY, http://ntl.bts.gov.
78. 33 U.S.C. § 701 (2006); 33 C.F.R. § 222 (2013).
79. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, http://www.fema.gov (last
visited Nov. 14, 2013).
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will prevent disasters. The governor of the state in which the disaster
occurs must complete a report indicating a state of emergency and
formally request from the President that FEMA and the federal
government respond to the disaster.80 Once the report is received, the
President then makes a Declaration of an Emergency and is allowed
to send emergency funds to state and local organizations to save lives
and protect property. Total assistance provided in a given declared
emergency may not exceed five million dollars.81 This amount is a
fraction of the costs required to permanently relocate the tiny Native
Village of Kivalina.
Three types of federal assistance are made available to the longterm rehabilitation of an area and its citizens after a disaster.82
Individual assistance is given, upon application, to individuals,
families, farmers, and businesses in the form of loans, grants,
emergency housing, tax relief, and unemployment assistance.83
Public assistance funds are granted to states, local communities, and
nonprofit groups to restore public systems and facilities.84 Finally,
matching mitigation funds are set up for states and local communities
to initiate projects to eliminate or reduce an area’s vulnerability to a
hazard.85 This federal assistance to state and local governments may
include the provision of equipment, supplies, facilities, and
personnel; technical assistance; loans; and sometimes grants.86
Relocation assistance under the FEMA framework is purely
temporary and is limited to victims of certain natural catastrophes
enumerated in the Stafford Act, such as hurricanes, tornados, and

80. The only exception to the state’s gubernatorial declaration occurs when an
emergency takes place on federal property or to a federal asset, for example, the
1995 Oklahoma City bombing. See generally The Declaration Process, FED.
EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY: http://www.fema.gov/declaration-process (last
visited Nov. 14, 2013).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 5193 (2006).
82. UNIV. OF FLA. INST. OF FOOD & AGRIC. SCIS., THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
IN A DISASTER, THE DISASTER HANDBOOK § 3.7, at 4 (National ed. 1998),
http://disaster.ifas.ufl.edu/pdfs/chap03/d03-07.pdf.
83. Id. at 6–8.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2.
86. 44 C.F.R. § 206.5 (2013).
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earthquakes.87 Drought is the only gradual ecological process listed
in the statute as a potential catalyst for a presidential disaster
declaration. One of the most significant hazards faced by Alaskan
coastal communities—erosion—is not included in the list of major
disasters in the Stafford Act.88
Based on FEMA’s written manual, it appears that the United States
has developed a comprehensive scheme to handle and prevent
domestic crisis. From a practical perspective, however, FEMA has
endured periods of harsh criticism, with none greater than that in the
wake of Hurricane Katrina. The response to Katrina and the failure to
find permanent housing for the displaced residents underscores the
reality that the U.S. government’s primary disaster relief framework
is ineffective and insufficient in scope.89
Relocation assistance is also available outside of CERCLA and
FEMA in the limited contexts of witness protection and eminent
domain. The United States Federal Witness Security program is
administered by the U.S Department of Justice and operated by the
U.S. Marshals Service. The program is designed to protect threatened
witnesses before, during, and after a trial.90 The Witness Security
Program was authorized by the Organized Crime Control Act of
197091 and amended by the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984.92 The U.S. Marshals have protected and relocated almost
87. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 5121–5207 (2006). See enabling regulations enacted under FEMA, 44
C.F.R. §§ 206.31–206.48 (2009).
88. Robin Bronen, Climate-Induced Community Relocations: Creating an
Adaptive Governance Framework Based in Human Rights Doctrine, 35 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 357, 366–67 (2011).
89. Even several months after the storm, FEMA reported that there were “1,297
applicants who still need[ed] temporary housing in FEMA commercial sites” in
Harrison County alone, which is merely one of Mississippi’s three coastal counties.
Memorandum from Bobby Weaver, Operations Chief, Harrison County Incident
Mgmt. Team, to the Exec. Comm. Members of the Harrison County Incident
Mgmt. Team (Apr. 7, 2006) (on file with author).
90. Witness Security Program, U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE, http://www.
usmarshals.gov/witsec/index.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2013).
91. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91–452, 84 Stat. 922
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2006)).
92. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–473,
98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
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10,000 individuals and families since the program began in 1971.93
Witnesses and their families typically get new identities with
authentic documentation. Housing, subsistence for basic living
expenses, and medical care are provided to the witnesses. Job
training and employment assistance may also be provided.
In the eminent domain context, the federal or state government will
assist an individual or family to vacate and move somewhere else.
Under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property
Acquisition Policies Act, the federal government or a state agency
will provide moving and related expenses, replacement housing for
homeowners including mortgage insurance, replacement housing for
tenants, relocation planning, and last resort housing replacement by
the federal government.94
Therefore, federally recognized tribes imperiled by climate change
impacts cannot secure assistance from any of these existing programs
to address their plight. A climate change relocation fund would build
on the logic of these permanent relocation opportunities under U.S.
law to provide meaningful support to communities like the Native
Village of Kivalina.
III. COMPARATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVES ON RELOCATION AND
CLIMATE ADAPTATION ASSISTANCE
To provide further conceptual support for a polluter-financed
climate change relocation fund in the United States, it is useful to
consider related initiatives in other nations. While the United States
offers little in relocation assistance, other nations have explored
funding relocation initiatives to proactively promote important
objectives such as public safety and economic efficiency. In addition,
other nations have developed climate adaptation funds that are
financed by private sector contributions.
Relocation initiatives to proactively safeguard public safety have
been undertaken within the past decade in Taiwan, Japan, and
Vanuatu. In 2004, communities in Taipei, Taiwan at high risk of

93. Id.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 4623 (2006); 49 C.F.R.§ 24.1 et seq. (2013).
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perilous landslides were relocated to safety.95 Taipei Mayor Ma
Ying-jeou promised to relocate two communities as soon as the
resources became available. The mayor was criticized by his
constituents for only relocating two of the thirty hillside communities
listed at risk of falling victim to landslides.96 The mayor accepted
fault and petitioned the central government for funds to aid his
constituents and the communities of nearby Sanchong City.
Similarly, in March 2010, a small community in Japan located on
the coast of Numazu, Shizuoka Prefecture applied to the government
for subsidies to relocate to higher ground after the tsunami in the
Tohoku region last year.97 Residents of the district applied for
subsidies from the central government under a program designed to
facilitate mass relocations in areas struck by disasters or under threat
of disasters.98 While subsidies for permanent relocation are unusual,
nothing in the public program expressly denies it. The residents have
asked the city to build a coastal levee twelve meters high and 150
meters long, but some community and city leaders believe the costbenefit analysis would favor relocation.99 The topic is open for
debate by all sides and, most importantly, the local and national
governments support such conversations and seek to offer assistance
for the health and safety of their residents.
Finally, in Vanuatu, the Canadian government provided funding to
relocate 100 villagers on Tegua Island in 2005. The relocation was
necessary because frequent flooding and erosion due to sea level rise
had made the original settlement uninhabitable.100
In Australia, proactive relocation has also been engaged as a means
of promoting the economic interests of its residents by balancing
labor shortages in some areas and rising populations in other areas.
95. Ma to Relocate Hillside Homes at Risk of Landslide, CHINA POST (Taipei
City), Sept. 19, 2004, available at http://www.chinapost.com.tw/news/2004/09/19/
52554/Ma-to.htm.
96. Id.
97. Shizuoka Coastal Hamlet Eyes Higher Ground, DAILY YOMIURI (Tokyo),
Mar. 20, 2012, at 2, available at 2012 WLNR 5844020.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Vulnerability and
Adaption to Climate Change in Small Island Developing States 17 (background
paper, 2007), http://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/adverse_effects_and_response_
measures_art_48/application/pdf/200702_sids_adaptation_bg.pdf.
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Community management committees have begun discussions within
their own networks about the growing frustration of high
unemployment in their communities due to population growth.101 The
population in these areas has grown rapidly due to the influx of
Sudanese and other African refugees. A team of academics and
statisticians conducted a study of relocating a number of refugee
communities in Melbourne to a less densely populated area of
Victoria, another province in the country.102
Funded by both public resources and private consortiums, the goal
of the relocation initiative was to alleviate high unemployment in the
overpopulated province of Melbourne, and bolster the southwestern
region of Victoria, which was suffering from a low-skilled worker
shortage.103 Upon agreement to work in Victoria, families were
offered relocation packages, mainly funded by the private entities for
which the individuals would work. The relocation package consisted
of two months’ rent, utilities, transportation costs relevant to the
identified needs of the family as assessed by the Migrant Liaison
Officer, and support to access education, employment, housing,
health, and community services.104 Families accepting this package
also had to make a commitment as part of their agreement for at least
one adult member of each family to be employed within one month
of arrival, secure private housing, and plan to settle permanently in
the area.
The study found that the migrant workers were pleased with the
new employment, which afforded them the labor protections that all
Australian workers enjoy. The study and analysis concluded by
recommending that other cities and provinces engage in similar
policies to balance overpopulation and work shortages.
The United States has the resources and the technology to engage
in such dialogue and responses, but disjointed governance has
ultimately led to only reactive initiatives, evidenced by the FEMA

101. Robyn Broadbent et al., A Tale of Two Communities: Refugee Relocation in
Australia, 42 AUSTL. J. SOC. ISSUES 581, 582 (2007).
102. Id. at 582–83.
103. Id. at 583–90 (“The projects were designed for mutual benefit and not as a
solution to the myriad of resettlement issues faced by urban and refugee
communities.”).
104. Id. at 589–90.
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framework and the lack of proactive measures and relocation
assistance for those permanently affected by natural disturbances.
Climate change adaptation funds in other countries are another
dimension of support for a climate change relocation fund in the
United States For example, in Brazil, the National Fund on Climate
Change was enacted in 2010, which uses funds from a tax on
domestic oil production profits to support a fund to address climate
change mitigation and adaptation.105 Similarly, in the Philippines, the
People’s Survival Fund was enacted in 2012, which established a
special trust fund for financing climate change adaptation programs
and projects to help make communities more resilient to climateinduced disasters.106 These funds—one privately funded and the
other government-funded—provide support for the implementation
of a climate change relocation fund in the United States.
Therefore, there is ample precedent in other nations for proactive
relocation assistance and for the financing of a climate change
adaptation fund. These two contexts of support must be properly
integrated to propose an effective climate change relocation fund in
the United States. Part IV of the article addresses these challenges.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR A CLIMATE CHANGE RELOCATION FUND IN THE
UNITED STATES
Establishing a government-administered fund to assist residents in
need of climate change relocation assistance is a form of “distributive
justice.”107 Distributive justice addresses how to properly allocate
goods, such as taxpayer dollars, within a society. A true distributive
justice fund is funded solely by taxpayer dollars, rather than by the
wrongdoers who created the compensable harm.108 Though this
105. Rhett A. Butler, Brazil to Impose Levy on Oil Profits to Fund Climate
Change Adaptation, Mitigation, MONGABAY.COM (Oct. 26, 2010), http://news.
mongabay.com/2010/1025-brazil_oil_levy.html.
106. Philippines: People’s Survival Fund for climate change adaptation
available to LGUs, ASIAN PAC. ADAPTATION NETWORK (July 10, 2013),
http://www.asiapacificadapt.net/news/philippines-peoples-survival-fund-climatechange-adaptation-available-lgus.
107. John G. Culhane, Tort, Compensation and Two Kinds of Justice, 55
RUTGERS L. REV. 1027, 1061–68 (2003).
108. Id.
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distributive justice model represents a departure from the traditional
American legal system, which embraces the “polluter pays” objective
that parties responsible for harm should pay the costs associated with
such harm, the “polluter pays” system of justice is difficult to
administer in the context of harms caused by climate change. Proof
of causation can be extremely difficult in cases where a victim is
attempting to hold a company liable for releasing greenhouse gases
that contribute to climate change because there are thousands of
companies worldwide emitting the same pollutants into the
atmosphere, and these emissions do not recognize territorial
boundaries of states. It is difficult, if not impossible, to pinpoint
which companies’ pollutants are the cause of the harm that occurred.
Therefore, distributive justice becomes a necessary remedy for the
victims of climate change who may be left with little or no potential
for compensation. However, like CERCLA, this distributive justice
model can be a hybrid of both general taxpayer contributions and
enhanced contributions from private sector entities that contribute a
substantial amount of greenhouse gas emissions to the global climate
change problem. As such, this model represents a hybrid of the
“polluter pays” and the distributive justice models of compensation.
Four questions must be addressed in proposing a possible
framework for a climate change relocation fund in the United States.
First, what sources(s) will provide the revenues to establish and
sustain the fund? Second, what administrative model should be
employed for the fund? Third, how will the revenues for the fund be
generated? Fourth, what segment of the population is the intended
beneficiary of the fund? This section of the article addresses these
questions and proposes a polluter-supported funding mechanism
through mandatory and voluntary contributions that draws on a
variety of models from related contexts for administering the fund.
The article proposes that the sole beneficiaries of the fund should be
federally recognized tribes.
The first question is relatively straightforward. Major emitters of
greenhouse gases should be the principal source of revenues for the
fund. Consistent with the “polluter pays principle,” a formula could
be used to determine a minimum threshold of annual emissions of
greenhouse gases in the private sector to be eligible for inclusion in
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the fund’s mandatory contributions.109 The polluter pays principle is
engrained in U.S. and international environmental policy. Principle
16 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development conveys
the principle as follows: “National authorities should endeavor to
promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of
economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the
polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution . . . .”110
This principle is also reflected in several provisions of U.S.
environmental law. For example, section 120(a) of the Clean Air Act
assesses a penalty against polluters who are not in compliance with
the statute based on the “economic value of the noncompliance,” and
CERCLA allows the government and individuals to sue polluters for
cleanup costs even if the pollution was caused long before CERCLA
was enacted.111 Requiring participation in the fund from those
substantially contributing to and benefiting from the harm associated
with climate change is the fairest approach.112 The more challenging
questions are the administrative model to employ, the method of
generating the revenue, and the intended beneficiaries of the fund.
A. Possible Models for the Fund
Potential models for the fund at the federal level are the Victim
Compensation Fund of 2001 and the BP Oil Spill Fund. One
109. For example, in the Kivalina litigation, the industries named in the
complaint represented approximately eighty-two percent of national greenhouse
gas emissions. See Envirofacts: Greenhouse Gas, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/enviro/
facts/ghg (last updated Dec. 5, 2013).
110. U.N. Conference on the Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro,
Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), Annex I (Aug. 12, 1992), available at http://www.
un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm.
111. See Clean Air Act § 120(a)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7420(a)(2)(A);
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act § 107,
42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2006).
112. While identifying significant greenhouse gas emitters as the principal
contributors to the fund, there are additional questions beyond the scope of this
article that need to be addressed regarding who will pay into the fund and to what
degree. In addition, the funds for this mechanism could be generated in part by a
carbon tax that applies to all U.S. residents, which would replicate the approach in
CERCLA that combined a general tax and a tax on generators of hazardous
substances to support the Superfund.
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dimension of the response to the terrorist attacks of September 11th
was the Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act
(ATSSSA). One of the key components of ATSSSA is the
“September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001” (the Victim
Compensation Fund).113 The Victim Compensation Fund was created
after a horrific tragedy occurred. The purpose of the fund is to
provide no-fault compensation to the victims and families of the
victims of the September 11th terrorist attacks.114 In addition to
providing compensation, the fund was established to protect the
airline industry from the prospect of an overwhelming number of
individual claims in the court system, which could potentially
devastate the airline industry’s finances and reputation.
Rather than a board of trustees, a single individual was given the
task of managing the Victim Compensation Fund. Kenneth Feinberg
was appointed Special Master of the fund. He traveled extensively to
meet with families and victims to determine their eligibility and the
amount they would receive.115 The fund established a set formula for
distributing funds to victims and families of victims to promote
equality that included: (1) non-economic loss; (2) economic loss; and
(3) collateral sources of income such as insurance, workers
compensation, and social security payments to be deducted.116 Noneconomic loss was awarded as a flat rate for everyone: $250,000 for
the dead victim and $100,000 for each spouse or dependent.117
Economic loss was configured based on the deceased’s earnings at
the time of death and potential future earnings depending on
education and current circumstances.118
Similarly, a climate change relocation fund should include a clear
formula for determining compensation to victims. However, the
formula used should depend on the type of harm caused. In the
113. Linda S. Mullenix & Kristen B. Stewart, The September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund: Fund Approaches to Resolving Mass Tort Litigation, 9 CONN.
INS. L.J. 121, 123 (2002).
114. Id.
115. Peter T. Elikann, Book Review, 90 MASS. L. REV. 48, 48 (2006) (reviewing
KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?: THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO
COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11).
116. Id. at 49.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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Kivalina scenario, each household should receive an amount for
relocation based on the number of family or household members. A
flat rate in that situation is the fairest way to approach the extremely
difficult task of relocating an entire village of people.
The BP Oil Spill Fund provides another model for a climate
relocation fund. The Oil Pollution Act (OPA) gives the United States
the ability to designate a “responsible party when an oil spill
occurs.”119 British Petroleum (BP) was designated the responsible
party for the Deepwater Horizon incident in the Gulf of Mexico in
2010 that resulted in one of the worst oil spills in history.120 As the
responsible party, BP is required to establish a procedure for the
payment or settlement of claims for interim, short-term damages.121
In an effort to comply with the OPA and avoid massive tort litigation,
BP waived the $75 million limit of liability and created a fund of $20
billion to pay claims.122
Kenneth Feinberg, the special master of the Victim Compensation
Fund, was selected to oversee the distribution of funds and
processing of claims for the BP oil spill. Unlike the Victim
Compensation Fund, which was authorized by Congress, the
authorization for the BP fund is less clear.123 The OPA only states
that a responsible party must establish a procedure for payment of
claims, but it does not designate any specific procedure. Moreover,
the BP Fund was funded exclusively by the party responsible for the
harm, and was not supplemented by taxpayer dollars. The fund
arguably provided a better way for victims to receive compensation.
The conventional tort litigation process is time consuming and
expensive with no guarantee of compensation. Moreover, the fund
vastly exceeded the inadequate $75 million liability cap under OPA,

119. 33 U.S.C. § 2714 (2006).
120. Linda S. Mullinex, Prometheus Unbound: The Gulf Coast Claims Facility
as a Means for Resolving Mass Tort Claims—A Fund Too Far, 71 LA. L. REV. 819,
829–30 (2011).
121. Id. at 833–34.
122. Id. at 834.
123. Id. at 836.

36

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXV

which allowed for more victims to be fully compensated for their
injuries.124
The BP Fund was created under the auspices of the “Superfund
myth” created by CERCLA.125 This “Superfund myth” is the idea
that a trust fund will compensate victims quickly and efficiently
while avoiding or deferring litigation over the liability of potentially
responsible parties.126 It is referred to as a “myth” because,
unfortunately, efficient resolution of claims is not always the
outcome. For example, the BP fund has denied more claims than it
has paid out. As of March 28, 2013, the fund had paid about $10
billion of the $20 billion placed in the fund.127 Despite the seemingly
large amount paid from the fund to date, many claims were denied
due to lack of documentation proving causation.128 OPA designates a
proximate cause requirement for causation. Many of the denied
claims were likely unable to show proximate cause because they
could not prove that the damage was caused by the BP oil spill and
not the result of Hurricane Katrina, effects from which the region was
still experiencing.129
The BP fund could provide a framework for a climate change
relocation fund. In the climate change context, however, identifying
responsible parties will be much more difficult than it is in the oil
pollution context. It is much easier to show causation of a spill from a
specific source than the causes and contributors of severe changes in
climate conditions over time from the emission of greenhouse gases,
especially when the greenhouse gases are emitted worldwide by
thousands of different sources. Given the causation challenges
involved in the BP oil spill context, the chance of a victim adequately
proving causation in the climate change context would be virtually
124. Alfred R. Light, Designing the Gulf Coast Claims Facility in the Shadow of
the Law: A Template from the Superfund §301(E) Report, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS
& ANALYSIS 11121, 11121 (2010).
125. See generally Alfred R. Light, The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Trust and
the Gulf Coast Claims Facility: The “Superfund” Myth and the Law of Unintended
Consequences, 5 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 87 (2011).
126. Id. at 87.
127. Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill Claims and Other Payments Public Report, BP
(Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/gulf-of-mexico/PublicReport-October-2013.pdf.
128. See Light, supra note 124, at 100.
129. Id.
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impossible. Even if the plaintiffs in the Kivalina case had been able
to overcome the procedural hurdles of standing and the political
question doctrine, they would face the daunting obstacle of
establishing causation at trial and likely ultimately fail in their case.
Nevertheless, the precedent of a fund, like the BP Oil Spill Fund,
to compensate for environmental harms can still provide a valuable
foundation for a climate change relocation fund. If the regulated
community is forced to bear the costs of the fund through carbon
taxes or premiums on greenhouse gas emissions, then the issue of
who is responsible will be moot. All claims will be paid directly from
the fund without the need to investigate which parties should bear the
blame, which was part of the challenge in the plaintiffs’ theory of the
case in selecting the twenty-two largest private emitters of
greenhouse gases in the United States. This approach will also
alleviate issues of further litigation between potential defendants
regarding contribution and indemnification, which has been an issue
in the CERCLA and BP oil spill distribution of funds.
Another possible model for a climate change relocation fund is the
Alaska Permanent Fund. After construction of the Alaska pipeline
began in 1974, Alaska voters approved an amendment to Alaska’s
Constitution establishing the Alaska Permanent Fund.130 The fund
was created to “provide a means of conserving a portion of the state’s
revenue from mineral resources to benefit all generations of
Alaskans” with the goal of maintaining “safety of principal while
maximizing total return” and to be used “as a savings device
managed to allow the maximum use of disposable income from the
fund for purposes designated by law.”131
The financial resources for the Alaska Permanent Fund are derived
from “at least [twenty-five] percent of all mineral lease rentals,
royalties, royalty sale proceeds, and federal mineral revenue sharing
payments and bonuses received by the state.”132 That money is then
invested in a diversified portfolio of public and private asset classes

130. Landmarks in Permanent Fund History, ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORP.,
http://www.apfc.org/home/Content/aboutFund/fundHistory.cfm (last visited Nov.
14, 2013).
131. ALASKA STAT. § 37.13.020 (2012).
132. Id., § 37.13.010.
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that are expected to produce income with some acceptable level of
risk.133
To date, most of the realized earnings have been distributed to
Alaska citizens in the form of a dividend, but such earnings could
potentially be used to help fund the relocation efforts of Alaska
natives facing the loss of their land from climate change impacts. The
earnings could also be used on projects that help mitigate or adapt to
the effects of climate change. Relocation efforts and mitigation or
adaptation projects promote the fund’s ultimate goal of preserving
the resources to benefit all generations of Alaskans because it will
potentially sustain large populations of ancestors and significant
tracts of land for future generations to enjoy the diversity of cultures
and natural resources that Alaska offers.
The fund also established the Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation
(APFC) to manage the fund’s investments. The APFC is run by a sixmember board of trustees appointed by the governor that meets six
times per year.134 A climate change fund should be administered in a
similar fashion by an agency created by the federal government,
perhaps within the Department of Homeland Security. The new
climate change relocation agency would be tasked with determining
who is eligible to receive funds and the proper amount of
compensation.
B. Methods of Generating Revenue for the Fund
Contribution to the fund can be enforced by way of a penalty, tax,
levy, or a permit system. Congress should amend the Clean Air Act
to include the regulation of carbon dioxide.135 By including carbon
133. Id., § 37.13.120.
134. About the Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation (APFC), ALASKA
PERMANENT FUND CORP., http://www.apfc.org/home/Content/aboutAPFC/
aboutAPFC.cfm (last visited Nov. 14, 2013).
135. As of this writing, this highly contentious process of amending the Clean
Air Act to address the regulation of carbon dioxide is still being litigated. In its
landmark decision in 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded in Massachusetts v.
EPA that greenhouse gases are covered by the CAA’s definition of air pollutant and
that the EPA must determine whether emissions of greenhouse gases from new
motor vehicles cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). In June
2012, the D.C. Circuit upheld EPA’s endangerment finding. Coal. for Responsible
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dioxide as a criteria air pollutant under the Act, carbon dioxide
emitters would be subject to the penalties for non-compliance under
section 120. All, or a specified percentage, of the penalties assessed
against emitters of carbon dioxide could be deposited into the climate
change relocation fund.
Another method to secure revenues for the climate change
relocation fund is through a carbon tax. According to CNN, “One
analysis by the Congressional Budget Office says a moderate, $20per-ton tax on carbon emissions could raise $1.25 trillion over 10
years.”136 The tax rate should be based on the marginal cost or the
“social cost” of carbon dioxide emissions, and imposed on all oil,
coal, and natural gas production in the United States.137
Implementation of the tax would occur through existing Internal
Revenue Service and Energy Department Programs.138
A carbon tax would generate revenue and potentially reduce the
amount of carbon dioxide emitted into the atmosphere over time. As
long as the tax is slightly higher than the benefits of emitting more
carbon, emissions are likely to reduce. If the tax does not produce the
desired reduction in emissions, it can be raised. Moreover, a carbon
tax credit can be given to those who implement carbon-reducing
Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012). In March 2013, that
decision was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Pacific Legal Found. v. EPA,
petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Mar. 20, 2013) (No 12-1153). The petition for
certiorari was denied, however, on October 15, 2013. See Andrew Childers,
Supreme Court Decision Reaffirms EPA’s Clean Air Act Authority over
Greenhouse Gases, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.bna.com/supremecourt-decision-b17179878188.
136. Van Jones and Phaedra Ellis-Lamkins, To End the Fiscal Slowdown, Tax
Carbon, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/16/opinion/jones-carbon-tax (last
updated Mar. 7, 2013, 9:30 PM). Carbon tax initiatives have taken center stage in
2013 as the regulatory tool of choice to address climate change in both the United
States and China, but many obstacles remain. See Raju Chebium, Boxer Pushes
Carbon Tax to Ease Global Warming, USA TODAY (Feb. 14, 2013, 5:59 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/02/14/global-warming-carbontax-barbara-boxer/1920963; Melissa Zhang, Chinese Carbon Tax: Hits and Misses,
BERKELEY ENERGY & RESOURCES COLLABORATIVE BLOG (Mar. 13, 2013),
http://berc.berkeley.edu/chinese-carbon-tax-hits-and-misses.
137. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlman, Combating Global Climate
Change: Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap and
Trade, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 3, 32 (2009).
138. Id. at 38.
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programs. Either all or a portion of the revenue from a carbon tax
could be placed in a climate change relocation fund. Even if only a
portion of the revenues were set aside for the fund, a carbon tax is
still likely to generate a significant amount of funding to be set aside
for those in dire need of relocation assistance.
Another way to generate revenue for the fund is through a permit
system, or cap and trade model. Once a limit on carbon emissions per
year is established, permits can be auctioned off each year to
emitters. The permits can then be traded on the private market.139 The
government will only receive revenue from the permits at their initial
auction. A price per carbon ton will have to be established, much like
the carbon tax system allowing emitters to purchase carbon emissions
at their stated auction value and then trade them for a higher amount
in the private market. Companies in violation of their permit will be
assessed a fine that could also be placed in the climate change
adaptation fund.
Another model to promote corporate responsibility while
protecting the populations that are particularly vulnerable to climate
change impacts is the Price-Anderson Act. This Act provides no-fault
insurance to benefit the public in the event of a nuclear power plant
accident that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission deems to be an
“extraordinary nuclear occurrence.”140 The industry bears the cost of
the insurance, which is pooled together in a fund to be disbursed in
the event of an extraordinary nuclear occurrence. The industry bears
the costs by paying an annual premium to cover nuclear reactors. The
fund has over $12 billion in insurance to cover a potential nuclear
event.141 This protection consists of two tiers of insurance payouts.
The first tier provides $375 million in liability coverage per incident.
If the $375 million is insufficient to cover the costs, the second tier
allows additional coverage of up to $12.6 billion.142
The Act has proven so successful that Congress has used the Act’s
insurance fund as a model for legislation to protect the public against
139. Shi-Ling Hsu, A Prediction Market for Climate Outcomes, 83 U. COLO. L.
REV. 179, 227 (2011).
140. Insurance: Price-Anderson Act Provides Effective Liability Insurance at No
Cost to the Public, NUCLEAR ENERGY INST. (Sept. 2012), http://www.nei.org/
corporatesite/media/filefolder/Price_Anderson_Act_Sept_2012.pdf.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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potential losses or harm from other hazards, including faulty
vaccinations, medical malpractice, and toxic waste.143 This type of
fund could work well in the climate change context. Industries
emitting greenhouse gases could bear the costs of funding by having
to pay premiums for all emissions. The funds would then be pooled
together as insurance protection to benefit the public in the event of
an “extraordinary climate change scenario.” It is critical for any
climate change relocation fund to prescribe in detail the types of
“extraordinary climate change scenario” that would be covered,
which could be limited to the need for permanent relocation.
C. Role of Indigenous Sovereignty and the Federal Trust
Relationship
The final dimension of the implementation of the proposed climate
change relocation fund is to determine to whom it applies. Climate
change impacts all of society to varying degrees; therefore, the need
to narrow the applicability of the fund is essential to ensure its
viability. The fund is meant to provide a complete remedy to
communities that face an imminent need for relocation and cannot
fund their relocation costs. Kivalina is a case study of this degree of
vulnerability and it is on this foundation that the fund should be
oriented. Kivalina is among the first of many indigenous
communities throughout the United States that will need to be
relocated within the next few decades because climate change
impacts will render their homeland uninhabitable.
Why should the fund be limited to federally recognized tribes
when other indigenous communities that are not federally recognized
may be equally deserving, as well as other non-indigenous
communities? The answer lies in the federal trustee relationship that
exists between the U.S. government and federally recognized tribes.
The United States is obligated by treaty to simultaneously protect
federally recognized tribes and recognize their inherent sovereignty
to manage their own affairs.144 Recognition of these tribes’
143. Id.
144. “[T]he United States has a trust responsibility to each tribal government that
includes the protection of the sovereignty of each tribal government . . . .” 25
U.S.C. § 3601(2) (2006); see also Reid Peyton Chambers, Compatibility of the
Federal Trust Responsibility with Self-Determination of Indian Tribes: Reflections
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sovereignty involves respecting the realities of how climate change
can disrupt and destroy a tribe’s cultural and spiritual ties to its
traditional lands. A need for relocation must therefore be
administered on a sensitive government-to-government basis between
the United States and these tribes to ensure that they are adequately
protected and that their traditions are preserved to the maximum
degree possible in finding a suitable new community for relocation.
Federal environmental law embraces this special government-togovernment relationship between the federal government and
federally recognized tribes. First, Congress recognized the special
sovereignty of federally recognized tribes by enabling them to apply
for treatment as state status under the Clean Air Act and Clean Water
Act to administer permit programs as a state government would on
their tribal lands.145 Second, Congress recognized the federal trust
relationship between the federal government and federally
recognized tribes in granting authority to the President under
CERCLA § 9626(b) to permanently relocate an Indian tribe or
Alaska Native village threatened by hazardous waste
contamination.146
The climate change relocation fund in this article would be limited
to federally recognized tribes; however, this proposal does not mean
that a climate relocation fund cannot eventually be made available to
other segments of the U.S. population in need of relocation
assistance. Federally recognized tribes like Kivalina certainly are not
the only communities in need of relocation assistance and unable to
pay for those relocation costs. However, these federally recognized
tribes are first in line for this assistance because of the federal
government’s trust relationship with these tribes, and the climate
on Development of the Federal Trust Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century,
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND., SPECIAL INST. ON NAT. RESOURCES DEV. IN INDIAN
COUNTRY (2005) (“Recognizing that the United States has, under the Constitution,
broad power over Indian affairs sufficiently extensive to make the tribes
comparatively vulnerable to the exercise of that power, this guardian-ward
construct also protects tribes from the peril to which that power potentially subjects
them.”).
145. See Treatment in the Same Manner as a State, EPA AM. INDIAN ENVTL.
OFF. TRIBAL PORTAL, http://www.epa.gov/tp/laws/tas.htm (last visited Nov. 14,
2013).
146. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
§ 126, 42 U.S.C. § 9626 (2006).
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change relocation fund must be administered with that reality in
mind. Other forms of assistance, such as grants and loans, may be
available to affected communities other than federally recognized
tribes. But as a matter of equity, the U.S. government’s failure to
adequately regulate climate change has betrayed the health, safety,
and cultural integrity of federally recognized tribes above all others
in this country as these communities now hang precariously at the tip
of the spear of devastating climate change impacts.
CONCLUSION
There is ample foundation in U.S. law and in the laws of other
nations to develop a climate change relocation assistance fund.
Existing models for climate relocation assistance under federal law
offer promise, but have severe limitations in their current form.
FEMA assistance is only eligible to only those whose pre-disaster
primary residences are rendered uninhabitable as the result of a major
disaster. The Native Village of Kivalina has not been rendered
uninhabitable as of this writing. Therefore, residents would have to
wait for disaster to strike before they are eligible for assistance under
FEMA. Moreover, the maximum amount of assistance available to
individuals and or families is $25,000. Estimated costs of relocation
for Kivalina have ranged between $100 and $400 million, which is a
potential average cost of at least $250,000 per individual. FEMA
assistance does not even come close to providing sufficient
assistance.
The United States’ ability to protect its citizens is evidenced by its
donation of billions of dollars into international climate investment
funds.147 While these funds are extremely beneficial to the
developing nations in need of aid from developed nations, they do
nothing to aid federally recognized tribes in the United States facing
the devastating loss of their lands as a result of climate change. The
United States needs to establish a climate change relocation fund
through any or a combination of the strategies addressed in this
article. The fund can be supplemented by soliciting donations from
147. Anita M. Halvorssen, International Law and Sustainable Development—
Tools for Addressing Climate Change, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 397, 420
(2011).
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multinational corporations and non-governmental organizations by
providing them with tax credits or other monetary incentives to do so.
The first step in establishing a possible climate change relocation
fund is whether the fund should be managed at the state, federal, or
international level. This article has proposed that such a fund would
be most effective if administered at the federal level. The structure of
the fund could resemble the federally created Victim Compensation
Fund or the defendant-created BP Oil Spill Fund. While certain
indigenous communities are impacted more severely by climate
change than others in the United States, the contributors to the
problem can be found in every state. Moreover, greenhouse gases do
not respect state territorial boundaries. Greenhouse gas emissions in
New York are just as likely to have a severe impact on Alaska as
emissions from Alaska-based sources.
Like the CERCLA model, funding for a climate change relocation
fund could come in part from taxpayer dollars, but should come
primarily from the polluting industries through a carbon tax. A
carbon tax is the most streamlined and effective way to secure
resources for such a fund. It promotes the “polluter pays” principle
by imposing a tax on oil, coal, and natural gas production in the
United States. The tax would also promote the reduction of carbon
dioxide emissions into the atmosphere by encouraging polluters to
achieve lower tax costs with lower emissions and by providing tax
credits for any carbon reduction plans implemented.
Relocation as a legal remedy for Kivalina under Alaska law also
may be possible, but difficult without federal aid. Alaska has already
established a centralized fund of money known as the Alaska
Permanent Fund. The Alaska Permanent Fund is a good example of
how states can structure and implement a climate change relocation
fund. Nevertheless, state funding in Alaska is not nearly adequate to
cover all of the federally recognized tribes within its sovereign
borders who need relocation assistance in the face of devastating
impacts wrought by climate change.148
148. In addition to the climate change relocation fund for federally recognized
tribes, the United States could also establish a low or no interest loan program for
those individuals or communities in need of assistance as a result of climate change
impacts. International climate investment funds are already implementing this
approach. For example, the Copenhagen Green Fund distributes grants and loans to
forty-five developing countries out of the funds donated by developed countries
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Therefore, a climate change relocation fund should be managed at
the federal level. The legislation should specify that those eligible for
compensation from the fund are limited to federally recognized
tribes. The most severe cases should be given the highest priority,
similar to the NPL system under CERCLA. The fund can be
managed by a government-created climate relocation agency, with a
similar but narrower charge than FEMA’s mandate.

into the fund. Halvorssen, supra note 147, at 420. Individuals or communities
applying for these grants and loans should be required to submit an environmental
impact statement to demonstrate their need. Grants and loans should be distributed
based on need and the amount of harm that has or is likely to occur. A full
discussion of this option is beyond the scope of this article.

